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Development assistance and the
lasting legacies of rebellion in
Burundi and Rwanda
Devon E.A. Curtis*
Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, UK
Rwanda and Burundi have both emerged from civil wars over
the past 20 years and foreign donors have provided significant con-
tributions to post-conflict reconstruction and development in the two
countries. Yet, although Rwanda and Burundi share several important
characteristics, their post-conflict social, political and economic tra-
jectories have been different. This article argues that the nature of the
ruling parties in Rwanda and Burundi is key to understanding the
countries’ relationships with donors. Rather than seeing aid as an
exogenous factor, causing particular development outcomes, it shows
how local party elites exert considerable agency over the aid relation-
ship. This agency is influenced by a number of different local contex-
tual factors, including how the parties were established, how they
evolved and the ways in which their civil wars ended. Thus, the arti-
cle provides an analysis of how local context matters in understand-
ing donor–recipient aid relationships, and how the ruling party in
Rwanda (the RPF) and in Burundi (the CNDD–FDD) emerged from
their respective conflicts with different relationships with international
donors.
Keywords: Rwanda; Burundi; development assistance; rebel movement
transitions; local agency
It has long been acknowledged that the effects of overseas development
assistance are contingent upon the domestic context of recipient countries. Thus
understanding development outcomes cannot be limited to analyses of the vol-
ume of aid, type of aid and identity of the donors, but must also consider the
relationship between aid and political, economic and social structures in the
recipient country. Likewise, in seeking to explain the relationship between
donors and recipients, several scholars have argued that well-established interna-
tional relations and development theories have underestimated the role of local
agency, meaning the agency of elites and other actors in aid-recipient countries.
While local agents certainly face structural constraints, there is a large and
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diverse literature, particularly in African politics and development, which
focuses on how African agents exert their influence in the international and
domestic spheres.1
Yet, even though there is some agreement in the literature on the importance
of local political context and local agency in understanding donor–recipient aid
relationships, there is no consensus on precisely how they matter. This article
focuses on international donor relations with Rwanda and Burundi, two coun-
tries that share important social, political and economic characteristics. Rwanda
and Burundi have been called false twins, because of their similar ethnic cleav-
ages, colonial histories and experiences of political violence.2 Nonetheless, there
are important differences as well (hence the name false twins). Perhaps most
notably, the majority Hutu dominated the postcolonial political, economic and
military landscape until the 1990s in Rwanda, whereas in Burundi it was the
minority Tutsi that dominated until the early 1990s.3 There was civil war in
Rwanda between 1990 and 1994 and in Burundi between 1993 and 2003, which
resulted in two former rebel movements coming to power.
Rwanda and Burundi have different relationships with donors, even though
development assistance has been hugely significant in both countries across a
range of sectors, both before the civil wars and afterwards. The article explains
how national elites in the two countries have influenced aid relationships. It
traces the development of the two ruling parties, the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) in Rwanda and the National Council for the Defence of Democracy–
Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD–FDD) in Burundi. It shows how
the RPF and the CNDD–FDD were influenced by their particular contexts and
by the ways their civil wars ended, leading to divergent relations with donors.
The trajectory and dominance of the RPF in Rwanda have meant that the
Rwandan regime has been better able to manage donors, whereas Burundi’s
more fractured political space has made it more difficult for the CNDD–FDD
regime to influence donors.
Aid is therefore not an exogenous factor leading to particular development
outcomes. Rather, aid is the product of particular histories, relations and interac-
tions. Local elites in Burundi and Rwanda are not entirely ‘free agents’, as they
are shaped and constrained by structures and histories, but they are not mere
pawns of powerful donors and their agendas either. The contrast between
Rwanda and Burundi is thus a contrast in how local agents negotiate the aid
relationship.
The article thus argues that the nature of the RPF in Rwanda and the
CNDD–FDD in Burundi is key to understanding aid relationships. It begins by
briefly outlining key aid patterns. It then shows how the two rebel movements
emerged from particular political, economic and social structures, and examines
the impact of the respective civil war endings: military victory by the RPF in
1994 and prolonged negotiated settlements in Burundi, culminating in a demo-
cratic electoral victory by the CNDD–FDD in 2005. Finally, the article shows
how this affected the two ruling parties and their relations with donors.
Development assistance in Rwanda and Burundi
Rwanda and Burundi are frequently compared since they are neighbouring states
with historical, geographical, social and political commonalities.4 As suggested
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in Table 1, however, economic and human development indicators are stronger
in Rwanda than in Burundi. Rwanda’s GDP growth rates, for instance, averaged
more than 10% per year between 1994 and 2004 and have been greater than 5%
a year since then, even after the global financial crisis.5
Thus the two countries have had divergent post-war economic trajectories,
despite their low-income status and similar (though not identical) histories and
social structures. This has led some authors to conclude that aid has played a
central role in post-war development in Rwanda and Burundi.6 Holmes et al
make a similar point about the advantages Rwanda has had thanks to substantial
budget support.7
Rwanda has been called an ‘aid darling’ and Burundi an ‘aid orphan’,8
although levels of aid have fluctuated over time in both countries. As shown in
Figure 1, Rwanda receives a greater volume of aid than Burundi, whereas the
volume of aid in the two countries was more similar in the 1980s. Both coun-
tries remain highly dependent on foreign aid.
As seen in Figure 1, aid levels to Rwanda rose sharply in 1993 with the
signing of a peace agreement and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mis-
sion. Aid dropped dramatically in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, rising
steadily again from 1997. In 1998 Rwanda re-established relations with the IMF
through its Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Programme. There was a
drop in development assistance from 2011 in response to concerns over the
Rwandan government’s activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC).
In Burundi official development assistance (ODA) decreased during the war
and especially in 1996 as a result of the sanctions that were placed on the coun-
try following a military coup. The Arusha Peace Agreement was signed in 2000
and a transitional government was instigated in 2001. Burundi re-established
relations with the IMF in 2001 and ODA steadily increased, especially after the
2005 elections. In 2006 Burundi was one of the first countries on the agenda of
the new United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. From 2007 onwards
Burundi therefore received funds from the Peacebuilding Fund, which was set
up to help fund quick impact projects in the aftermath of conflict.9 Aid dropped
in 2010 because of donor concerns over financial scandals and governance after
the elections that year.
These trends suggest that donors do have leverage, but this does not capture
the full story in donor–recipient relations. Donor decisions about aid commitments
and disbursements are not separate from the politics of recipient countries. Thus,
Table 1. General indicators in Rwanda and Burundi.
Rwanda Burundi
Population (million), 2013 11.78 10.16
Size (km2) 26 338 27 834
Population density (per km2) 447 365
Human Development Index 2013 (rank out of 187 countries) 151 180
GDP 2013 in US$ billion 7.52 2.71
Growth 2012 7.3% (2013 est. 5%) 4% (2013 est. 4.5%)
GNI per capita 2013 $630 $260
Sources: Based on data from the World Bank at http://data.worldbank.org/country/burundi and http://data.world
bank.org/country/rwanda and from UNDP Human Development Report 2014, 162.
Third World Quarterly 1367
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to understand differences in Rwandan and Burundian post-war donor relation-
ships, it is helpful to consider how the two ruling parties manage and influence
donors. The Burundian CNDD–FDD is a weaker party than the RPF in Rwanda,
and has less leverage vis-à-vis donors, despite the CNDD–FDD’s greater post-war
domestic democratic legitimacy. The RPF is better able to coordinate, manage and
manipulate donors, and to channel assistance into priority areas. These differences
can in part be explained by how the two movements were created, how they
evolved and how their respective civil wars ended.
The emergence and evolution of the RPF and the CNDD–FDD
The CNDD–FDD and the RPF are both former rebel movements but they emerged
from different systems with different constraints. A number of authors have argued
that the organisational structures of a rebel movement continue to influence its
transition to a political party.10 As Sara Dorman explains, rebellions that aim to
‘liberate’ populations from oppressive rule often have a well-articulated ideology
to attract recruits and civilian supporters and to present to the media, academics
and donors. These legacies and institutional practices tend to play themselves out
in post-liberation years.11 There may also be the lingering influence of a ‘mentalité
du maquis’, or a way of thinking that develops from spending years in an armed
struggle.
The RPF and the CNDD–FDD emerged in different political circumstances
but there were important parallels in the histories of the two countries that influ-
enced later governance. First, unlike many other African states, neither Rwanda
nor Burundi is an artificial creation of colonial rule. By the time they were
absorbed into German East Africa in 1898–99 most of the territory had already
been incorporated into two kingdoms, with centralised state structures. The
kingship was the focus of popular loyalties and factional struggles. So both
states are strongly socially anchored, with current boundaries that closely mirror
Figure 1. ODA in Rwanda and Burundi (all sectors, all donors).
Source: Data from OECD-DAC, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats.
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pre-colonial political boundaries. Compared with Rwanda, however, the
Burundian Kingdom was less centralised and the Mwami (King) was more
dependent on popular support.12
Second, following Independence on 1 July 1962, both states were strongly
authoritarian. After a coup in 1973, when President Habyarimana took power in
Rwanda, the National Revolutionary Party for Development (MRND) became
the only party. The state was centralised and hierarchical and had an extensive
presence at the local level, controlling many aspects of Rwandan social life.13
Similarly before the 1990s there was one party in Burundi, the Union for
National Progress (UPRONA), and social mobility depended upon participation
in the party. The party was linked to the country’s only women’s movement,
youth organisation, radio station and newspaper.14 The state was centralised and
influenced all levels of society.15 The economies of both Rwanda and Burundi
were organised through generalised patrimonial rent-seeking. Small business
entrepreneurs depended upon having patrons within the administration or the
military.
A third feature in both countries is that power structures were ethnically
exclusive and regionally divided. Whether the Hutu/Tutsi distinction was histori-
cally a racial or a social class difference is contested, but ethnic categories
became rigid during and after colonial rule.16 While the ethnic composition of
the two countries was similar, the basis for post-Independence exclusion was
different. In Rwanda, following the 1959 Revolution and the overthrow of the
Tutsi monarchy, many Tutsi fled to refugee camps in neighbouring Uganda and
the majority Hutu dominated post-Independence governments.17 In Burundi it
was the minority Tutsi who dominated post-Independence political, military and
economic structures.18
Fourth, development assistance played an important role in both countries
before their civil wars. As Peter Uvin has noted, Rwanda was seen as a ‘model
of development in Africa’ before the genocide, with strong development
indicators such as high GNP growth and growing industrial production. It also
had strong human development indicators, such as high vaccination rates and a
vibrant civil society.19 In Burundi the Tutsi ruling class used the language of
national unity and development to garner legitimacy, particularly under the
presidency of Bagaza from 1976. Unifying symbols such as the independence
hero Prince Louis Rwagasore were propagated, and there was a denial of ethnic-
ity.20 At times there were tensions with donors but Bagaza was successful in
attracting development assistance. There are indeed interesting parallels between
the Bagaza regime in Burundi and the current Rwandan regime.
Thus the RPF and the CNDD–FDD emerged in countries with a history and
tradition of strong statehood. There was greater political accommodation in pre-
colonial Burundi, but the colonial and post-colonial elites in the two countries
were ethnically exclusive. Post-Independence governments in the two countries
were characterised by high levels of authoritarianism and social control, and also
high levels of development assistance.
Significantly, however, the RPF has its origins outside Rwanda, whereas the
CNDD–FDD was a breakaway group from a political party within Burundi. The
RPF can be traced to Tutsi refugees who fled to Uganda following the Rwandan
revolution of 1959. The Tutsi refugee community formed the Rwanda Refugees
Third World Quarterly 1369
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Welfare Association, which was later renamed the Rwandese Alliance for
National Unity (RANU) in 1979. Persecution of the refugees grew increasingly
severe after the fall of Idi Amin in 1979 and many young Rwandan Tutsi men
joined Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) guerrilla move-
ment. In January 1986, when Museveni and the NRA captured Kampala, his
force included an estimated 3000–4000 Tutsi Rwandan fighters. In December
1987 RANU changed its name to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). In
October 1990 the RPF invaded Rwanda, saying that they wanted to return to
their homeland.21 This invasion occurred at the same time as the Rwandan
regime faced economic vulnerabilities resulting from a drop in food production
and coffee prices, as well as political vulnerabilities resulting from pressures
from donors to open political space in the context of the post-cold war enthusi-
asm for multiparty democracy.
Initially, therefore, RPF members were recruited from the armed forces of a
foreign country. The RPF was highly influenced by the ideas and structures of
the NRM/NRA, as well as by other revolutionary movements such as
Mozambique’s Frelimo party. The RPF fighters were well-trained and highly
disciplined. The first two leaders of the RPF, Fred Rwigyema (killed in battle in
1990) and Paul Kagame (the current president of Rwanda) were senior figures
in the NRA.22 The RPF claimed to be liberating Rwanda, yet in the early stages
of war the RPF could not recruit young Tutsi men from the local population in
classic guerilla fashion, since the RPF did not have the support of the Rwandan
population in whose name they claimed to be fighting.23 Instead, young Tutsi
exiles from all over the Rwandan diaspora, but especially from Uganda, joined
to fight in a country that they did not know. This began to change in late 1992,
when the RPF started recruiting from the Tutsi population within Rwanda as the
Rwandan government’s anti-Tutsi rhetoric increased.
Unlike the RPF, the Burundian CNDD–FDD has its origins within the coun-
try as a breakaway faction of the political party that had won the 1993 elections.
These elections led to a veritable reversal of power, with a mostly Hutu party,
FRODEBU, winning over the incumbent mostly Tutsi party, UPRONA, which
had dominated since Independence. The new FRODEBU president, Melchior
Ndadaye was assassinated by members of the Tutsi-dominated army three
months after taking office, leading to widespread massacres across the country.
Unable to control the country, FRODEBU members were divided over whether
or not to share power with the former ruling party UPRONA. FRODEBU
reluctantly agreed to share power but some members refused, led by Leonard
Nyangoma. Nyangoma and his associates created a military wing called the
CNDD, which aimed to recapture political power by force and to instigate army
reform.24 The CNDD was able to unite some of the different pockets of armed
resistance that had emerged around the country in response to President Nda-
daye’s assassination, although some people joined other Hutu armed movements
such as Palipehutu and FROLINA.25
The CNDD thus emerged as a more radical wing of an established political
party in Burundi, even though at various times during the subsequent civil
war the CNDD had rear bases in Tanzania and in the DRC.26 Many of the CNDD
leaders were former heads or deputies in FRODEBU, and it was only in 1996 that
the executive committee of the CNDD became independent from FRODEBU.27
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As a result of shifting alliances, regional dynamics and financial considerations,
the CNDD split several times. There were frequent clashes with the other main
Hutu armed movement, the Palipehutu–FNL, and tensions within the CNDD
between members from different regions and religions.28 In 1998 Nyangoma was
ousted by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye and the movement was renamed the
CNDD–FDD. It split again in 2001 and Pierre Nkurunziza, the current president of
Burundi, became the leader. Nkurunziza and his faction of the CNDD–FDD stayed
out of the regionally sponsored Arusha peace negotiations to end the Burundian
civil war. Even once the Arusha peace agreement was signed in 2000 and the
Burundian transitional institutions were established in 2001, the CNDD–FDD
continued to wage war, claiming that the real issue, Burundian army reform, had
been inadequately addressed.
So while the CNDD–FDD and the RPF were both rebel movements seeking
to influence and capture state power, they were very different kinds of organisa-
tions. The RPF was highly trained and disciplined, with a strong focus on
political education. The movement was divided into different zones and sectors,
and was very well-organised and coherent. In contrast, the CNDD–FDD was
constantly affected by desertions and realignments, depending on alternative
opportunities for leaders and fighters. The CNDD–FDD leadership had profound
disagreements over whether and when to join peace negotiations, whether to
share power and how to engage with international and regional mediators.
Furthermore, the CNDD–FDD was competing with other Hutu rebel movements
in Burundi, particularly the Palipehutu–FNL.
Thus the RPF had weak links to the Rwandan population inside the country,
but they were an internally coherent, disciplined, well-structured organisation and
they did not face competition from other Tutsi groups. The CNDD–FDD had
more domestic popular support, but it was more internally fragmented and faced
intense competition from other Hutu groups. As shown below, these differences
had an effect on donor relations.
Military victory and negotiated settlement
The Rwandan conflict and genocide ended with the military victory of the RPF
in July 1994, whereas the Burundian conflict ended through protracted negoti-
ated settlements, leading to democratic elections won by the CNDD–FDD in
2005. These different conflict endings have important ramifications on gover-
nance and institutions, and subsequent relations with donors.29
When the RPF took over as ruling party in Rwanda, many members of the
former regime had fled to refugee camps in Zaire, in other neighbouring coun-
tries, or overseas. The RPF reaffirmed its commitment to the terms and the spirit
of the internationally sponsored 1993 Arusha Accords. The former single-party
the MRND and the extremist Hutu party CDR were banned, but other political
parties took up their seats in a National Unity government and parliament as set
out by the Arusha Accords. Nonetheless, the decisive military victory meant that
the RPF had tight military control over the country, and this enabled the RPF to
establish social and political control relatively quickly.
Relations between the RPF and some donors became close in a reasonably
short space of time. Aside from France, which had provided extensive support
Third World Quarterly 1371
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to the previous Rwandan regime, most Western donors and diplomats were
reluctant to question the good faith of the new RPF rulers, even as a number of
human rights organisations began to outline some of the questionable practices
of the new regime.30 The USA, the UK and The Netherlands were relative
newcomers to Rwanda and became important donors.31 Western governments
had been criticised for their inaction during the genocide, but they were now
committed to assisting reconstruction through development.32
Thus the way in which conflict ended in Rwanda led to increased centralised
control by the RPF, and ‘guilt’ over the inadequacy of international response to
genocide gave the RPF greater legitimacy and policy independence vis-à-vis
donors. Donors, especially those with little previous experience in Rwanda, were
eager to contribute to reconstruction efforts and were receptive to the narratives
being articulated by the RPF.33
In Burundi the negotiated settlement to civil war brought about a very
different dynamic. The war in Burundi and the protracted peace negotiations con-
tributed to the fragmentation of the state.34 The Arusha Agreement was signed by
19 parties in 2000 but the CNDD–FDD was not a signatory, as it had stayed out
of the internationally and regionally brokered negotiations.35 Burundian transi-
tional institutions were set up from 2001, but the CNDD–FDD continued to fight,
claiming that the peace process was not legitimate. The Burundian transitional
leadership, regional mediators and international diplomats tried to entice the
CNDD–FDD leadership into the peace process and transitional institutions
through a mixture of carrots and sticks. In late 2003 a ceasefire agreement was
reached which gave key CNDD–FDD leaders important cabinet portfolios in the
transitional government, and guaranteed that CNDD–FDD commanders would be
given positions within the army and police.36
In 2005 the CNDD–FDD won multiparty democratic elections by a signifi-
cant margin and former rebel leader, Pierre Nkurunziza, became president. One
of the reasons for the CNDD–FDD’s popularity was that it was not associated
with the extended Arusha peace process, which many Burundians viewed as an
elite-driven exercise that had enriched politicians in the capital Bujumbura. Fur-
thermore, many Burundians across the country believed that the CNDD–FDD
was the party that could bring security to a war weary population. Also the
movement had extensive shadow administrative structures in many parts of the
country during the war, which it was able to mobilise during the election cam-
paign. Nonetheless, despite the electoral victory, Burundi remained highly
divided after the 2005 elections, with elites scrambling to strategically reposition
themselves to take advantage of the new political landscape and the power-
sharing requirements in the new Constitution.37
The extensive and prolonged negotiations to end the Burundian conflict
therefore contributed to the further factionalisation of Burundian political space
but also had important consequences for CNDD–FDD relations with the donor
community. International and regional facilitators were more accustomed to
working with other Burundian parties, particularly UPRONA and FRODEBU,
since the CNDD-FDD had stayed out of the peace process for such a long time.
There were thus strong personal and professional connections between
UPRONA and FRODEBU and international donors and diplomats, whereas the
CNDD–FDD representatives were relatively unknown.38
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In contrast to the RPF, then, the CNDD–FDD gained domestic legitimacy
through popular support expressed in what was largely regarded as a fair demo-
cratic contest in 2005. Yet the very nature of these negotiated settlements, par-
ticularly of the carefully balanced Burundian power-sharing settlement, meant
that politics and power in Burundi were much more fractured and diffuse than
in Rwanda. In Rwanda, military victory, a receptive international audience
because of guilt over the genocide, and the RPF’s tight internal hierarchical
structure meant that it was easier for the party to exert effective social and
political control and to articulate a consistent narrative to donors.
Local agency and donor relations
The nature of the two ruling parties and the way in which the civil wars ended
have important implications in terms of donor relations. In Rwanda the
post-genocide political record of the RPF is a matter of enormous disagreement.
Critics focus on human rights abuses committed by the RPF against political
opposition figures, as well as in the DRC. It is difficult to express one’s views
openly in Rwanda, or to assert political identities that fall outside officially
circumscribed categories.39 Critics also say that Rwanda’s impressive growth
rates hide large and growing vertical and horizontal inequalities in the country.
Government policy is to concentrate land-holdings and modernise agriculture
through intensification, leading to large gaps between the urban elites in Kigali
and small-scale farmers.40 There are ambitious, top-down rural development
schemes designed to encourage villagisation, to commercialise production and to
promote regional crop specialisation, with harsh penalties for non-compliance.41
Supporters of the regime, on the other hand, point to economic success and
notable progress on a range of social and economic indicators, despite a very
difficult history.42 They praise the RPF for being able to (re)build a strong
state.43
Both critics and supporters point to the ability of the RPF to exert consider-
able agency in the donor relationship. Despite its heavy reliance on donors, the
RPF has achieved a high level of political autonomy.44 There are several factors
that have increased the RPF’s ability to direct and manage donor relations. First,
military victory by the RPF helped it gain a near monopoly over information
and the production of knowledge about the history of the genocide, and enabled
relations with new donors. Aid workers, international (mainly anglophone) jour-
nalists, scholars and donors who arrived in Rwanda in the immediate aftermath
of genocide often knew very little about the country and were willing to accept
the new government’s version of the truth.45 The RPF actively cultivated close
diplomatic, aid and intelligence relations with the USA and the UK.46 Thanks to
the RPF’s origins in Uganda, many of its officials speak English very well and
have emphasised some donor priorities such as gender equality and effective
governance, while simultaneously pursuing their own political agenda.47 For
instance, Rwanda has comparatively high percentages of women in the national
parliament and in the labour force.48
Second, the RPF used the language of unity and reconstruction, which res-
onated with donors.49 In this ‘transformed’ Rwanda ethnic identities no longer
matter, but are always in danger of resurfacing (thus requiring heavy-handed
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governance tactics).50 Instead of ethnic categories, the categories in Rwandan
legal and administrative documents are derived from the official RPF interpreta-
tion of the genocide: survivor, old caseload returnee, new caseload returnee, sus-
pected genocidaire.51 In the absence of popular support within Rwanda, the RPF
uses memory and memorialisation of the genocide as a means to justify its
power.52 Furthermore, the RPF presents itself as an essential bulwark against the
risk of future genocide, and has used this justification to pass legislation, such
as the genocide ideology law of 2008, which removed voices of dissent or
opposition.53 The risk of future violence has also been used to justify Rwanda’s
military presence in the DRC.
Third, the RPF has defined itself as a party offering modernity, development
and progress. While the RPF cannot draw upon democratic legitimacy, it derives
its legitimacy from economic progress, or what is sometimes called ‘perfor-
mance legitimation’. Interestingly this is reminiscent of earlier government
strategies. In the 1970s, despite exclusionary and authoritarian governance, the
Rwandan government garnered legitimacy through the discourse of successful
‘development’. In 1974 the Rwandan parliament was renamed the National
Development Council and the president announced that Rwanda’s 143 com-
munes would be the ‘motors of development’.54 Today some authors say that
Rwanda should be characterised as a developmental patrimonial state, albeit
with some qualifications.55 The RPF wholly owns the private sector holding
company Tri-Star Investments/Crystal Ventures Ltd (CVL) and has majority
stakes in many other leading Rwandan companies.56 Profits from the operation
of subsidiaries are taxed and either reinvested or returned as dividends to the
RPF.57 Marysse et al say that, when making decisions about aid allocation,
donors look at the technocratic elements of governance such as government
effectiveness, the regulatory burden, corruption and rule of law, instead of politi-
cal sensitivities, meaning that Rwanda is an attractive recipient.58 In 2010
Rwanda was ranked 67th out of 143 countries in the Doing Business Report,
and was called the world’s top reformer.59
Fourth, the RPF has positioned itself as being central to efforts to bring secu-
rity to unstable parts of Africa.60 It has a highly trained military and is currently
the sixth largest troop and police contributor to the UN.61 Rwanda deployed its
first peacekeepers to the African Union Mission in Sudan in 2004. Since then it
has contributed, among others, to the AU–UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
(UNAMID), the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the UN Stabilization
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the UN
Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA), the Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
(UNOCI), the UN Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), and the
African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic
(MISCA).62 These contributions should not be underestimated. When Rwanda
was criticised in a 2010 draft UN report the Rwandan government warned that
it could withdraw its peacekeepers from Darfur.63
Fifth, RPF rhetoric mirrors the language of local ownership and African
solutions. For instance, RPF officials often use the language of the 2005 Paris
Principles on Aid Effectiveness.64 The Rwandan government developed its
‘Vision 2020’ policy guidelines, outlining targets and goals to transform Rwanda
into a middle-income country by 2020.65 Given the RPF’s skill at using ownership
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language that appeals to its most important donors, the international donor
community has been inclined to follow the priorities and plans set by the
government.
Thus the RPF has been successful in managing donors and controlling the
narrative about its post-conflict trajectory. Nevertheless, since 2010, criticism of
Rwanda among many donors has increased. In 2011 and 2012 key donors,
including the USA, UK, Germany and the Netherlands delayed disbursement or
withdrew part of their aid because of renewed allegations by the UN that
Rwanda was supporting M23 rebel activity in the DRC.66 It is too early to say
if this marks a fundamental shift in donor relations. There are also some signs
that the internal coherence of the RPF regime has increasingly come under
stress, although most critics are in exile.
Burundi, on the other hand, has been consistently unable to exert the same
kind of leverage over international donors. The negotiated settlement to the con-
flict in Burundi, the politics of accommodation and the divided power-sharing
political landscape have led to competing poles of power within Burundi. In
Rwanda the RPF has maintained tight discipline within the party, with detractors
forced to go into exile. In Burundi constitutional provisions for power sharing
have meant that the CNDD–FDD is required to include dissenting voices within
the party, and it has recruited many prominent Tutsi within its ranks. As
described above, the CNDD–FDD never had the same level of discipline as the
RPF, because of the different conditions it faced in its armed struggle. Indeed,
Willy Nindorera points out that the same neo-patrimonial and factionalised prac-
tices that currently characterise the Burundian government also characterised the
earlier CNDD.67
One might have expected that a Burundian emphasis on democracy, inclusiv-
ity and shared power would appeal to donors, especially since international and
regional actors were instrumental in the establishment of the Burundian power-
sharing system. Yet the CNDD–FDD has been unable to articulate a narrative
that resonates with donors. At the time of its creation, throughout its armed
struggle, as well as during the post-conflict period, the CNDD–FDD has been a
fractured organisation with competing voices that have hindered the emergence
of such a narrative. Even though the post-war Burundian political environment
– with its multiparty elections and more inclusive political space – stood in
marked contrast to the Rwandan one, it was not possible for the CNDD–FDD
to put forward a compelling narrative based on democracy, rights and inclusiv-
ity. In part this is because the CNDD–FDD has increasingly turned to more
coercive and authoritarian tactics and governance strategies, particularly since
the 2010 electoral campaign. The CNDD–FDD has tried to tighten its control of
state companies, provincial governorships and the court system. It has tried to
emulate the RPF’s political governance,68 and has sought to assert itself as the
only legitimate decision maker that can distribute the spoils of office in return
for loyalty. The youth wing of the CNDD–FDD, the Imbonerakure, has been
accused of violence and intimidation against opposition members in the country-
side.69 The large protests in Bujumbura in 2015 against President Nkurunziza’s
decision to run for a third presidential mandate were met with further violence
and repression against the independent media, civil society and the opposition.
Thus a narrative of democracy and inclusivity is not credible.
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The CNDD–FDD was also unable to put forward a narrative based on
economic performance and technocratic management. In general, the aid system in
Burundi has supported and even strengthened the neo-patrimonial system that
benefits the ruling elite.70 Economic relations are largely neo-patrimonial, as in
Rwanda, but since structures are more fractured, patrimonialism is less likely to be
developmental. In other words, the CNDD–FDD is not able to be directive in the
same way as the RPF. Decentralisation was reintroduced in 2005 but this has rein-
forced non-developmental neo-patrimonial political structures.71 The financial
sector in Burundi is used as a source of rents rather than development finance and
thus has not had a significant effect on economic development.72 Institutions are
weak and Burundi has a limited capacity to mobilise revenues.73 Weak capacity
has also affected monitoring ability, which further affects accountability.74 In 2011
a Vision 2025 document was released by the government, which articulated a
vision of goals for the country to 2025, including an annual GDP growth of 10%
and a reduction in the poverty rate.75 It is very unlikely, however, that these goals
will be met.
Furthermore, as outlined above, when the CNDD–FDD won the 2005 elec-
tions, relations with the UN mission were strained, in part because the donor
community was accustomed to dealing with the two other main political
parties.76 CNDD–FDD officials perceived the UN and other international actors
to be biased towards the political opposition and civil society, and felt that,
since their party had won the elections, the UN mission should leave gover-
nance tasks to the new democratically elected government. As relations grew
worse, international donors described the CNDD–FDD as inexperienced,
intransigent, authoritarian and in need of ‘training’.77 CNDD–FDD officials used
the language of sovereignty, legitimacy and autonomy in an attempt to loosen
donor influence and to exert their control and agency. Several of the most senior
UN officials in the country, including two United Nations Special Representa-
tives of the Secretary-General, were seen as being too close to the opposition
and were asked to leave the country by the government.
Despite these attempts to assert its autonomy, the CNDD–FDD has not been
able to coordinate or direct donors in the same way as the RPF. A number of
institutions have been set up to manage relations, such as the National Commit-
tee for the Coordination of Aid, established in 2005. A permanent secretariat for
this National Committee was established to monitor aid flows and increase
coherence and coordination, to support the government’s implementation of the
Paris Principles, and to serve as the secretariat for the Partners Coordination
Group.78 However, in practice, while the government has embraced the aid
effectiveness agenda, it has not been able to implement many of the principles.79
Since donors largely mistrust Burundian institutions, they often work outside
these national structures.
The CNDD–FDD has also tried to exert agency through security narratives.
Like Rwanda, Burundi has contributed troops to peacekeeping missions, most
notably to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) as well as to the
MISCA, which became a UN force in September 2014 (MINUSCA). The
CNDD–FDD has tried to justify its harsh and unlawful treatment of opposition
members with language echoing the Rwandan security discourse, but this has
not significantly mitigated donor criticism.
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Conclusions
Despite its authoritarianism and human rights abuses, the RPF has largely main-
tained its image as an effective moderniser in the eyes of many donors, consis-
tently emphasising the country’s economic accomplishments as an alternative
(African) source of internal legitimacy. Paradoxically the more fractured but
more inclusive and democratic Burundian state has had less leverage vis-à-vis
donors. This has worrying implications, as it suggests that, under some condi-
tions, more monolithic, authoritarian and repressive regimes can better manage
and influence donors. Indeed, the CNDD–FDD learned a lesson through watch-
ing the RPF, and has increasingly limited political space and governed in a
heavy-handed, coercive and exclusive manner. The rising tension and violence
in the lead-up to the 2015 Burundian elections, and the constitutional
controversy over President Nkurunziza’s candidacy, present a sobering view of
Burundi’s political trajectory.80 Many regional leaders and international donors
strongly criticised President Nkurunziza and withdrew support for the 2015
elections. The crisis has highlighted serious divisions within the CNDD-FDD
and the vulnerability of Burundi’s post-war institutions, with further violence
and increased authoritarianism as two likely outcomes.
This article has shown that international donor involvement in Rwanda and
Burundi is, in part, a product of very different war-time trajectories. Aid is a
consequence of particular relationships, not only a cause, and ruling elites in
recipient countries play a critical role in constructing those relationships. Part of
the difference between Rwandan and Burundian aid relationships can be explained
by the different political contexts leading to the emergence of the RPF and
CNDD–FDD, their different internal structures, and the fact that the Rwandan
civil war ended in military victory, while the Burundian civil war ended in pro-
tracted negotiated settlements. Thus the RPF has been better able to articulate a
single narrative vis-à-vis donors, and has more policy autonomy and a stronger
ability to direct its international donor engagements. The CNDD–FDD operates
within a more fractured political context and it has had much more difficulty
managing donor relations. Yet in both countries it is the wider population that con-
tinues to suffer the consequences of the gap between the rhetoric and actions of
both national elites and international donors.
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